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NOTE
Where Do We Stand Now?
Manuel Lujan, Jr., Secretary of the Interior,
Petitioner v. Defender of Wildlife
One of the most fundamental principles of our judicial system is
that aggrieved parties are entitled to their day in court to argue the merits
of their case. But the right to sue is not unrestricted. Article III, Section 2 of
the United States Constitution extends the power of the federal judiciary
only to "cases and controversies." This restriction is rooted in the separation of powers implied by the structure of the Constitution. Simply put,
the legislative branch, i.e. Congress, is empowered "to make all laws"; the
executive branch, i.e. the President and the executive agencies, is empowered to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed"; and the federal
judiciary is empowered to adjudicate the legal rights of individuals under
the laws of the United States.
A primary purpose of the cases or controversies requirement is to
ensure that the courts will not intrude into areas which are committed by
the Constitution to other branches of government.' Interpretation of this
restriction on judicial power has resulted in a number of doctrines which
stem from Article III. These doctrines, such as ripeness, political question
and standing, are concepts which allow the judiciary to limit access to the
courts if the judges determine that it is not appropriate for an unelected,
unrepresentative branch of government to resolve a particular dispute.
Any of these doctrines can be and are used by the judiciary to close the
doors to the courts. Recently, the requirements associated with standing
have been used by the United States Supreme Court to deny a decision on
the merits of certain environmental cases where the plaintiffs have not
demonstrated sufficient concrete injury.
For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, several environmental groups challenged a regulation promulgated by the Department of the
Interior which rescinded the requirement to consult with the Department
when foreign projects with United States support destroyed species pro1. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
2,112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992) [hereinafter Defenders V].
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tected under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 3 In Lujan, the Supreme
Court used the doctrine of standing to deny an association of environmental groups the right to a resolution of their case on the merits. However,
Lujan should not be viewed as slamming the door on standing for environmental organizations. Rather, it simply reemphasizes old, familiar hurdles and requires more particularized recitations of harm. This Note
describes the statutory and case law underpinnings of the Lujan decision,
outlines the development of the Lujan case, analyzes the affirmative lessons learned and errors to be avoided that can be extracted from the opinions, and applies these lessons to a pending environmental case in which
standing is a threshold issue.
UNDERLYING LAW
In order to understand the reasoning in Lujan, at a minimum, it is
necessary to outline recent case law related to standing and particular
aspects of the Endangered Species Act.
4
Selected Case Law Related to Standing
Organizational Standing.
For an organization to sue on behalf of its members, it must meet
a three-part test.5 Only one of the elements is in contention here: the organization may assert the rights of its members if the members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. An organization can meet
this element of the test for standing if at least one member can overcome
the constitutional and prudential barriers to standing.

Constitutional or core components of standing.
Over the years, numerous United States Supreme Court decisions
have defined and refined the requirements that the Court interprets as
being essential components of standing which meet the case or controversy provision of Article III. Three fundamental requirements are considered an "irreducible minimum" 6 by the Court. First, the plaintiff must
show that he/she has personally suffered or will suffer an injury-in-fact.
This may be defined as an actual or threatened 7 invasion of a legally-pro3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
4. See M. Wolok, Note, Standing for Environmental Groups: Procedural Injury as Injury-in-Fact,
32 Nat. Res. J. 163 (1992). This note summarizes the history of standing as applied to environ-

mental groups.
5. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333,343 (1977). The other
two parts of the test are: 1) that the interests which the organization seeks to protect must be
related to the organization's purpose, and 2) that neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested may require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
6. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464,472 (1982).
7. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99 (1979); Valley Forge,454 U.S. at 472.
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tected interest which is, a) concrete and particularized, 8 and b) "actual or
imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" 9 Second, a causal link must
exist between the injury and the challenged action. That is, the injury must
be "fairly... trace[ablel to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
...th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before
the court." 10 Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to'' "speculative," that
the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Prudential requirements.
In addition to the core or constitutional requirements of standing,
the Supreme Court has, over the years, imposed certain prudential Jimitations on standing which are "part of judicial self-government.'1 2 Prudential limitations allow the courts to reject a suit, even when the
constitutional requirements are met. Prudential restrictions can be overcome by congressional creation of a private right of action such as is conferred in the citizen suit provisions in the ESA. However, constitutional
13
barriers to citizen suit cannot be overcome by congressional fiat.
Procedural injury as a ground for standing.
A fourth concept developed in case law which is relevant to Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife is the doctrine of procedural injury as a ground for
standing. According to this legal theory, a procedural injury occurs when
an administrative agency allegedly violates a procedural requirement of a
law and when Congress expressly or impliedly creates a legal interest in
persons to affect agency decisions through the violated procedures.
Through 1990, six federal circuits and several federal district courts recognized procedural injury as a form of injury-in-fact. 14 However, a 1986 D.C.
Circuit dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia 15 foreshadowed his plurality
opinion for the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. In Centerfor Auto
Safety, Justice Scalia implied that organizational plaintiffs carry the initial
burden of pleading specific facts to back up allegations of injury-in-fact.
While that case did not allege procedural injury, the importance of concrete injury was stressed as a requirement of standing.

8. Allen v.Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); and
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,740-41 n.16 (1972).
9. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,102 (1983).
10. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organizations, 426 U.S. 26,41-42 (1976).
11, Id.at 38, 43.
12. 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
13. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 100.
14. See Wolok, supranote 4, for an excellent discussion of the development of the doctrine
of procedural standing. Wolok's footnote 105 lists the federal circuits and districts that have
recognized procedural injury-in-fact.
15. Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 793 F.2d
1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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In Lujan, Justice Scalia makes it clear that a "person who has been
accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that
right without meeting all normal standards for redressability and immediacy;" however, the violation of procedural rights alone,
without injury to
16
concrete interests, is insufficient to confer standing.
Endangered Species Act of 197317
Four sections of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) relate to the
standing issue. First, the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce are
required to determine which species of wildlife and plants are endangered
or threatened with extinction and to list such species. 18 This section is not
limited to domestic application and more than half of the listed species are
species whose primary ranges are outside of the United States. 19 This section is important to the Lujan case because the alleged potential injuries to
listed species were in foreign countries.
Second, Section 1540(g), "Citizen Suits," states that:
any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf-(A) to enjoin any person... who is alleged to
be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation listed under the authority thereof; or.

.

. (C)

against the Secretary (of Interior) where there is
alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any act or
duty under Section 1533 of this
20 title which is not discretionary with the Secretary.
The importance of this section in Lujan is that it arguably creates a
legal interest in all citizens to sue for a violation of ESA consultation procedures, regardless of specific injury.
Third, under Section 1532(13), environmental associations are
"persons" and may bring suit in their own names.
Fourth, the codification of the ESA Section 7(a)(2) at 16 U.S.C. Section 1536 (a)(2) states that:
2) Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and
with the assistance of the Secretary (DOI),insure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of such species which is determined by the
21
Secretary... to be critical ....
16.
17.
18.
19.

Defenders V,112 S.Ct at 2142-43 n.7.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 E2d 1035,1037 (8th Cir.1988) [hereinafter Defenders In].

20. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (emphasis added).
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This is the procedural section of the ESA that Defenders allege the Department of the Interior violated. If procedural injury, as interpreted by a number of circuits prior to Lujan, is sufficient grounds for standing, then this
provision plus the citizen suit provision above would be sufficient to create standing for the plaintiffs to have their case heard on the merits.
In accordance with Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, in 1978 the Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, on behalf of
the Secretary, published a final rule establishing procedural regulations
governing interagency consultation under Section 7 of the ESA. This
stated that the obligations imposed by Section 7 applied "extraterritorially,"22 i.e. outside of the United States. However, on August 8, 1979, Leo
Kuliz, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior (DOI), sent a letter to
the Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks (DOI) expressing reservations about this interpretation of Section 7.
In 1983, a revised regulation was proposed which reinterpreted
Section 7(a)(2) to require consultation only for agency actions in the United
States or on the high seas.23 This rule was finalized in 198624 and became 50
C.F.R. 402.01 (1991). It limits the consultation requirement to the United
States and the high seas. The substance of the Defenders claim is that the
rule is invalid because it violates the plain language and the legislative history of the Endangered Species Act. In 1987, Defenders sued the Secretary
of the Department of Interior under the citizen suit provision of the ESA.
Their arguments for standing primarily rested on the allegation that the
rescission of the rule violated a procedural right to have consultation occur
and that the citizen suit provision conferred a legal interest in the enforcement of the procedures guaranteed by the Endangered Species Act.
POSTURE OF THE CASES
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel (Defenders )25
Statement of the Case
In 1987, the Defenders of Wildlife brought suit, in the United
States District Court of Minnesota, challenging the Secretary of Interior's
promulgation of a rule, 26 under the Endangered Species Act. The rule
rescinded a previous requirement that government agencies consult with
the Secretary when agency action in foreign countries might jeopardize
endangered or threatened species or their habitat. In support of their right
to bring suit, the plaintiffs' complaint 2 7 stated that the members of their
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

43 Fed. Reg. 870, 874 (1978).
48 Fed. Reg. 29,990 (1983).
51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986).
658 FSupp. 43 (D.Minn. 1987) [hereinafter Defenders 1].
51 Fed. Reg. 19,930 (1986).
Amended Complaint [2.
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organization benefited both professionally and personally from observing
endangered and threatened species whose primary ranges are outside of
the United States. This, claimed Defenders, gave them an interest in
enforcing the ESA. Apparently the complaint did not allege any specific
agency action in foreign countries that had adversely affected endangered
species as a result of the Secretary's reinterpretation of Section 7.
The Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of plaintiffs' standing and
finally, in a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion, the plaintiff listed eight projects in foreign countries which they alleged harmed
endangered species. However, because the standing issue related to the
injury suffered by the plaintiffs, not the animals, this response was something of a legal non sequitur.
The district court granted the Secretary's Motion to Dismiss for
plaintiffs' lack of standing. It gave two reasons. First, the allegations of
general benefit were insufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact. Second, in
light of the fact that all of the listed foreign projects had begun before the
reinterpretation of Section 7, the court concluded that it was possible that
consultation had already occurred and, because the plaintiffs did not raise
the issue of a mandate for continuing consultation, no harm, or injury-infact, had been shown.
Analysis
First, plaintiffs should have argued that reinitiation of formal consultation is required even if consultation has occurred for specific listed
projects, when new information indicates that a proposed or ongoingaction may jeopardize endangered or threatened species or their habitat.
If Defenders had been specific about the consultation status of each project
and had outlined new information that would require reconsultation, it
seems likely that the court could not have used this rationale to deny
standing.
Second, this case was joined after SierraClub v. Morton,2 9 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that mere interest in the problem of
environmental protection is insufficient to confer standing. In that case the
Court denied the Sierra Club standing because it failed to allege that any
of its members would be directly affected by the Mineral King development. In Defenders I, the organization did not heed the lesson of SierraClub
v. Morton and their action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e. no case or controversy, no standing. They, like the Sierra Club,
failed to list, as individual plaintiffs, members who would be harmed by
the increased risk to endangered species caused by the new recission of
the need for consultation.
28. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376,1387 (9th Cir. 1987).
29. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel (Defenders /)30
Statement of the Case
In Defenders II, the Defenders appealed the dismissal of their suit,
saying that the District Court had erred by denying them standing to sue.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court and held that plaintiffs did
have standing to challenge the Secretary's reinterpretation .of the Section 7
consultation requirement.
Apparently, Defenders' briefs argued a number of new, salient
facts which persuaded the court that they satisfied the constitutional
requirements for standing. For example, Defenders claimed that their
members used at least some of the specific area affected by the eight listed
foreign projects. Under its injury-in-fact discussion, the court cites Wilderness Society v. Griles31 for the proposition that when the government acts
directly against a third party (i.e. the agencies) whose expected response
will in turn injure the plaintiff, the relevant injury-in-fact inquiry is
whether "the third party's response to the challenged governmental
action will injure the plaintiff at all." 32 The court also cites United States v.
Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures(SCRAP) 33 and Sierra
Club v. Morton34 for the proposition that, "[ain interest in aesthetic, conservational, and recreational values will support standing when an organizational plaintiff alleges that its members use the area and will be adversely
affected." 35 The court concluded that the Defenders alleged sufficient
injury-in-fact under these standards.
In addition, the Court of Appeals interprets the complaint to
allege a procedural injury. The Secretary acknowledges that a procedural
injury would be a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact, but he contends that
The Eighth Circuit found that Defendthis is not alleged in the complaint.
6
ers plead a procedural harm.
The second element of constitutional standing is causation. The
Defenders' claim is that if agencies which contribute funding to foreign
projects are not required to consult with the Secretary, then there is an
enhanced risk that those projects will harm endangered and threatened
species and their habitat and that will, in turn, harm the aesthetic and professional interests of its members who use the specific areas listed. Circuit
Judge Wollman concludes that the District Court erred when it found that
consultation may already have occurred because for at least one of the
eight projects, the complaint alleges that no Section 7 consultation was
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Defenders II].
824 F2d 4, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id.
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Defenders II, 851 F.2d at 1040.
Id. at 1041.
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ever conducted and, for purposes of a motion to dismiss against Defenders, the court must accept that allegation as true. Furthermore, Judge Wollman cites Sierra Club v. Marsh37 for the proposition that reconsultation is
required when any new information reveals that ongoing projects may
harm endangered or threatened species or their habitat. Judge Wollman
concludes that the District Court erred when it ruled that the reinterpretation of Section 7 could not have caused the plaintiffs harm because all of
the projects were initiated prior to the new rule. Under Marsh, he concluded they were under a continuing duty to consult until the new rule
wiped out that obligation.
Judge Wollman goes further in his causation discussion by citing
the Ninth Circuit opinion in City of Davis v. Coleman3 8 for the idea that it is
not reasonable to require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action
will have particular environmental effects, because to require proof of
harm would require "the plaintiff [to] conduct the same environmental
investigation that he seeks in his suit to compel the agency to undertake." 39 The import of this reasoning is that Defenders, essentially, need
not prove causation in order to satisfy the Eighth Circuit.
In fact, Judge Wollman goes so far as to cite the Washington, D.C.
Circuit for finding that when Congress authorizes citizen suits, Congress
itself has legislated both the requisite causation and redressability.40 He
says that he agrees with "Defenders' contention that Congress has determined that the remedy for the harm to their members' personal, professional, and aesthetic interest in endangered
4 1 species is consultation
between the Secretary and the action agency."
Analysis
In Defenders II, the Eighth Circuit performed feats of syllogistic
magic in an effort to allow Defenders a shot at the allegedly invalid regulation reinterpreting Section 7. Clearly, the Judge is stretching a point to
allow Defenders their day in court. However, the Eighth Circuits' reasoning and holdings on standing are eventually overturned by the Supreme
Court;4 2 therefore, the lessons learned from this iteration are largely negative. These arguments are unpersuasive on the issue of standing.
However, despite the liberal interpretation of the citizens' right to
sue, in Part 143 of his opinion, Judge Wollman lights the fuse under what
may be the biggest time bomb of the Defenders' suit: redressability. There,
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
521 F2d 611,670-71 (9th Cir. 1975).
Defenders II (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1975)).
Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Defenders I, 851 F.2d at 1043.
Defenders V, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
Defenders II, 851 F.2d at 1043.
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he cites two Appeals Court rulings that, "After consultation, 'the final
decision of whether or not to proceed with the action lies with the agency
itself. Section 7 does not give the Department of the Interior a veto over
the actions of other federal agencies, provided the required consultation
has occurred." 4 4 This limits consultation to a procedural inquiry. Thus,
even if consultation does not occur and there is a procedural injury-in-fact,
if the agency could then proceed anyway, it is difficult to argue that requiring consultation would redress the potential harm to endangered species.
They may be harmed whether or not there is consultation.
45

Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, (DefendersII1)

Statement of the Case
After the Eighth Circuit found that Defenders did have standing,
the case was remanded to the District Court. At that level, both parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After reviewing the standards
for summary judgment, the court denied the Secretary's motion because it
"fe[It] that the Eighth Circuit ha[d] already determined the standing question in this case."4 6 The court then analyzed the merits of the claim on the
basis of the plain language and the legislative history of the ESA. Summary judgment was granted to Defenders on the merits.
Analysis
Because the purpose of the analysis in this paper is to deduce the
current status of standing requirements, the discussion of the merits of the
case is omitted here.
47

Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan (Defenders IV)

Statement of the Case
When the District Court accepted the decree of standing from the
Eighth Circuit and awarded summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the
merits, the Department of the Interior appealed. At that point, most of the
arguments on both sides of the standing (and the merits) issue had been
aired previously. This appeal was tried before a four-judge panel with Circuit Judge Gibson writing the opinion.
This time around, the Eighth Circuit, perhaps persuaded by Judge
Gibson, who had taken part in the Defenders II appeal, decided unanimously that: 1) Defenders had standing to challenge the regulation, and 2)
44. Id. at 1037 (quoting National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 979 (1976); see also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303 (8th
Cir. 1976).
45. 707 F.Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989) [hereinafter Defenders IIl].
46, Id. at 1084.
47. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 E2d 117 (8th Cir 1990) [hereinafter Defenders IV].
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that the challenged regulation was invalid because Congress intended to
extend the consultation obligation of Section 7 of the ESA to agency actions
48
in foreign countries as well as in the United States and on the high seas.
Analysis
At this time, the Secretary only questioned the injury-in-fact criteria. He did not contend that the causation and redressability requirements
were not met.'This is important because it is a tacit admission that the causation and redressability requirements may not truly be required for constitutional standing. In an unpublished manuscript, 49 Richard Brown
argues that the causation and redressability standards evolved from the
prudential "zone of interests" test and, therefore, may be fulfilled by a
congressional grant of a private right of action in citizen suit provisions.
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia and the current Court still include causation
and redressability in the three-part test for constitutional standing. Still, it
may be productive in future cases to argue that causation and redressability requirements evolved from prudential, not constitutional, concerns
and that prudential concerns may be overcome by a legislative grant of
standing to sue in citizen suit provisions.
A second point which may be useful in future argument is the
court's discussion of procedural injury. It quotes Fernandez v. Brock for the
proposition that,50 "In determining whether a given statutory duty creates
a correlative procedural right, we look to the statutory language, the statutory purpose, and the legislative history," and finds that for the Endangered Species Act, the Congress intended to create "correlative procedural
rights.., the invasion of which [is] sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
injury-in-fact in article III." 51 Unfortunately, this line of reasoning probably would not be productive because the Supreme Court, in Defenders V,
disagreed with the Eighth Circuit.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders V)52
Statement of the Case
When the Eighth Circuit found for Defenders on the issue of
standing and on the merits, the Secretary petitioned for certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and on
June 12, 1992 handed down the opinion that reversed the Eighth Circuit
holding and held that Defenders did not have standing.
48. Id. at 117.
49. R. Brown, CongressionalInterpretationof Article Ill-An Opportunity Missed in Defenders
of Wildlife v. Hodel (unpublished manuscript, University of New Mexico School of Law, 1991).
50. 840 F.2d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 1988).
51. id.
52. 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
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Analysis
The Court was divided on the issues. Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor dissented. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but not
in the reasoning. Justices Kennedy and Souter joined Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist, White, Thomas and Stevens to create a seven-to-two majority
on the judgment; but, on grounds different from Stevens, they differed
with the plurality on the reasoning in Part III-A of the opinion, which part
related to injury-in-fact. The plurality, in an opinion delivered by Justice
Scalia, consisted of only four justices: Scalia, Rehnquist, White and Thomas. This suggests that careful analysis may offer lines of argument that
could find favor with a future plurality or majority and that might allow
environmental groups to prevail on the issue of constitutional standing.
In order to organize the threads of the analysis of Defenders V,first,
the plurality arguments will be outlined. Second, the dissent's reasoning
will be contrasted. Finally, the opinions of the three "swing" Justices,
Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter, will be analyzed to determine whether
their concerns could be melded with the dissents' opinion to construct a
useful line of future argument.
Reversing the summary judgment for Defenders, the majority
concludes that Defenders did not have standing to bring suit. In Part I,
Justice Scalia outlines the three irreducible elements which he says a plaintiff must prove to attain constitutional standing. These are: 1) injury-infact, i.e. a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of a
legally protected interest; 2) causation, i.e. the injury has to be "fairly
traceable" to the challenged action of the defendant, not the result of independent action of a third party not before the court; and 3) redressability,
i.e. it must be "likely," not "speculative" that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.
In Part II, Justice Scalia's arguments seem to focus on causation
and redressability. The recission of the regulation interpreting Section 7 by
the defendant, the Secretary of the Interior, applies to agencies not before
the Court. Justice Scalia says in this case, causation and redressability
hinge on the response of the agencies to the regulations and then, in turn,
the foreign countries must respond to agency recommendations and
actions. Because third-party responses are involved, the plaintiff bears an
additional burden to demonstrate causation and redressability.
In Part III-A, Justice Scalia applies these principles. He concludes
that Defenders did not meet the burden, on motion for summary judgment, of setting forth specific facts demonstrating, at least, injury-in-fact
and redressability. Defenders' claim to injury is that lack of consultation
with respect to certain United States-funded activities abroad "increas[es]
the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species." 5 3 Even
53. Complaint 915, app. 13.
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though he admits that the desire to observe animal species, even for
purely aesthetic purposes, is a cognizable interest, Scalia asserts that
Defenders would have had to show that listed species were in fact threatened by cited projects and that one or more members would be directly
affected by the increased threat to listed species in order to meet the
injury-in-fact requirement.
The Defenders alleged the following facts to establishing injuryin-fact. Ms. Joyce Kelly traveled to Egypt in 1986 and observed the habitat
of the Nile crocodile (but did not actually see one). She stated that she
hoped to return to observe the crocodile directly. Her claim is that she will
be harmed if the United States aids the rehabilitation of the Aswan High
Dam. Ms. Amy Skilbred traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and observed the
habitat of the Asian elephant, leopard and other endangered species (but,
again, did not actually see these). She hoped to return and claimed that the
Mahaweli Project would jeopardize the habitat of these endangered species and thus would harm her chances of observing these animals on a
hoped-for return
trip. Scalia finds these potential future harms not "actual
54
or imminent."
Next, the opinion rejects three theories of standing proposed by
Defenders. The first theory, "ecosystem nexus," proposes that "any person
who uses any part of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversely affected by a
funded activity has a standing even if that activity is located a great distance away."5 5 This was previously rejected in Sierra Club v. Morton56 and
in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,57 in which the Court held that the
member claiming injury must use the specific area affected by the challenged activity.
The theory of "animal nexus" is that anyone who has an interest
in seeing or studying endangered animals anywhere on the planet has
standing. This is rejected as far too attenuated an interest under SierraClub
and National Wildlife Federation.
Third, the theory of "vocational nexus" would confer injury-infact on anyone who has a professional interest in endangered animals, no
matter where the animals are located. Justice Scalia implies by his reasoning that, even if a single project would harm a species that a specialist is
studying, as long as there are other populations and as long as the scientist
has no tie with that specific location, then even vocational nexus is too
speculative to confer injury-in-fact.
At least two lessons can be learned from Part III-A. First, organizations hoping for standing to challenge federally funded actions should
start a registry of all scientific projects related to endangered or threatened
54. Defenders V,112 S.Ct. at 2139.

55. Id.
56. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
57. 405 U.S. 871 (1990).
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species anywhere in the world and then sign up those investigators as
members. This process would ensure that organizations have direct ties
with specific locations. Second, they should fund less litigation and more
science that would demonstrate the link between specific projects and risk
to endangered species. More lawsuits do no good if environmental groups
are not able to achieve standing, and standing will be difficult to achieve
without more specific research which addresses injury-in-fact and causation.
In Part III-B, Justice Scalia is only joined by three other Justices,
Rehnquist, White, and Thomas; therefore, this may be taken as dicta. This
part raises a still unresolved redressability issue: Even if the Secretary
returns to the former interpretation of Section 7 and requires consultation
by the agencies, are the funding agencies bound by that requirement?
Would a requirement to consult redress the harms Defenders claim? Justice Scalia states "this is very much an open question." 58 He contends that,
because jurisdiction depends on the facts at the time the complaint was
filed and because at that time at least one agency contested consultation as
related to foreign projects, that at that time, there was no certain redressability. When the Secretary promulgated the first regulation, he thought it
was binding, but that position was repudiated by the Solicitor General.59
In fact, in Defenders II, Judge Wollman pointed out that, even if the
agencies must consult, there is no requirement that they change their
actions in conformity with those consultations. 60 In Sierra Club v. Froehlke,
the Eighth Circuit stated that, "Consultation under Section 7 does not
require acquiescence. Should a difference of opinion arise as to a given
project, the responsibility for decision after consultation is not vested in
the Secretary but in the agency involved." 61 In National Wildlife Federation
v. Coleman, the Fifth Circuit said, "Section 7 does not give the Department
of Interior a veto over the actions of other federal agencies, providing that
the required consultation has occurred." 62 The lack of a veto power
applies to United States high seas and foreign actions; redressability could
prove to be a problem in many ESA challenges.
Defenders challenged the rescission of a regulation63 that previously required interagency consultation when foreign projects supported
by the United States threatened species protected by the Endangered Species Act. Such consultation is procedural in nature; Justice Scalia notes that
for procedural injuries which also meet the injury-in-fact test, neither lack
of redressability nor immediacy should bar suit for lack of standing.
58. Defenders V 112 S. Ct. at 2140.

59. Id.
60. Defenders H1,851 F.2d at 1037.
61. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289,1303 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976).
62. Coleman, 529 F.2d at 371.
63. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,990.
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Therefore, if a procedural injury is found, the fact that an agency may proceed in spite of an unfavorable consultation should not create a redressability problem when standing is considered.
This section, III-B, is a warning for the future. If the Endangered
Species Act is brought up for reauthorization in 1992, it is essential that
consultation regulations be clearly mandatory and applicable to foreign
projects. It is also essential that funding for such projects must be withdrawn if the consultation demonstrates harm to endangered species or
their habitat, which harm cannot or will not be mitigated. Otherwise, mere
consultation will not redress the alleged harms and United States tax dollars will continue to contribute to the extermination of species.
Part IV of the majority opinion may be the key to solving the
potential causation and redressability problems. In this section Scalia
essentially notes that when a plaintiff has successfully demonstrated that
he/she has, in truth, suffered a procedural injury, that is, if the disregard
of a procedural requirement "could impair a separate concrete interest of
theirs," 64 then "[tlhe person who has been accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests can assert that right without
meeting all the
65
normal standards for redressability and immediacy."
Thus, as long as there is procedural injury-in-fact, the citizen suit
provision provides standing to challenge agency procedures without
regard to the immediacy of the injury or redressability. Obviating the need
to show redressability logically obviates the need to show its reciprocal,
causation. Redressability in this case means that if the courts require a particular action (consultation), a particular harm (increased risk to endangered species) will not occur. This assumes underlying causation, i.e. that
a particular action causes a particular harm. If a showing of procedural
and actual injury presumes redressability, then it also presumes the
underlying causation. Such a presumption might be subject to rebuttal,
but the burden for showing lack of harm would be on the defendant
instead of requiring the plaintiff to do the scientific research required to
demonstrate the increased risk of harm. This implied shift of the burden of
proof may be important in later cases.
If procedural and actual injury are found, then under Justice
Scalia's reasoning, it may be presumed that the requested remedy would
redress the harm. Then, the burden would shift to the defendant to establish, by credible research, that the proposed action had not caused or
would not cause the alleged harm. If that were successfully demonstrated,
then the courts might find that the requested remedy (curtailing the proposed action) could not redress the alleged harm. Thus, if the presumption
of redressability is rebuttable and not absolute, it would be possible to lose
64. Defenders V 112 S. Ct. at 2142.
65. Id, at 2142-43 n.7.
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standing if the opposition successfully showed that the presumption of
redressability is not correct under a given fact pattern.
Even if causation and redressability are presumed upon a showing of procedural injury when plaintiffs seek adjudication in the courts,
they cannot bypass the absolute, rock-bottom requirement that the party
seeking review must have suffered a concrete injury. Apparently the
majority of the Court has compromised a bit. Even though the majority
seems to agree that Congress can confer statutory standing in citizen suit
provisions to challenge agency procedures under a law, that does not
abrogate the foundation constitutional requirement that the parties must
have suffered a concrete and particularized injury.
The final lesson to be learned from Scalia's opinion is that environmental organizations should ally with professionals such as big game
outfitters and photo safari guides, as well as zoological and botanical
researchers. Such individuals have concrete and particular, often pecuniary interests in biodiversity and the perpetuation of species. Next time out
of the gate, Defenders need to list as plaintiffs a couple of members who
have an incontrovertible personal, preferably economic, interest that
would be damaged by the challenged action.
Dissent: Justices Blackmun and O'Connor
The dissent's first point of contention is that in order to survive
the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, Defenders only need to
have raised a "genuine issue" of material fact as to standing.66 They need
not at that stage prove that they were actually or imminently harmed.
Blackmun points out that the majority confuses the Defenders' evidentiary burden (affidavits asserting specific facts) with the standard of proof
for summary judgment (i.e. the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact). Blackmun has a point. Defenders may not have proved specific facts
which would mandate standing, but they did allege facts which if, for purposes of summary judgment, are taken to be true, did raise genuine issues
of material fact regarding standing. Therefore, when the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's decision to deny the Secretary's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of standing, that decision was correct
because there were genuine issues of material fact.
Blackmun and O'Connor believe that the majority requirement
for a concrete citation of specific plans to return to a site at a specific time
"will resurrect a code-pleading formalism in federal court summary judgment practice ....

"6

This is a logical inference from Scalia's opinion.

However, the injury-in-fact requirement is a valid criteria for a case or controversy; the environmental groups must be as specific as possible about
concrete injury to members at the pleadings stage.
66. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
67, Defenders V,112 S. Ct. at 2153 (Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor dissenting).
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The dissent accepts the ecosystem nexus theory of injury in that
"environmental destruction may affect animals traveling over vast geographical ranges... ."68 Under those circumstances the Court would
probably find such a nexus appropriate, although in this case, Defenders
do not allege such a range. The lesson here is that if an organization is
unable to prove specific use of a particular area, it may be possible to identify an endangered species in that area that migrates into a specific area
that is utilized by members. If an organization can do this, it should then
try the ecosystem nexus theory.
The dissent next addresses the plurality opinion that Defenders
did not demonstrate redressability. The first obstacle is that third-party
agencies cannot be made to consult with the Secretary because they, arguably, are not subject to the Secretary's regulations. The dissent points out
that in prior litigation, the Secretary has taken the position that the regulations are binding on other agencies and that the Secretary and the Solicitor
General may not conveniently change that position for purposes of this
suit. The lesson here is that a redrafted ESA must make it clear that final
DOI regulations do bind federal action agencies.
The second redressability issue addressed by the dissent is that
the plurality suggests that, even if consultation does occur, the agencies
are still not required to terminate funding and the harm could still occur.
Therefore, simply compelling consultation would not, in the plurality
view, redress the alleged harm. The dissent points out that the goal of a
procedural requirement like consultation, as in a National Environmental
Policy Act Environmental Impact Statement, is better informed decisions
with more opportunity to consider and implement mitigation measures.
That goal would be achieved by requiring consultation.
Finally, the dissent takes on the separation of powers issue. Just
how far may Congress go in conferring private rights of action on citizens
who wish to challenge government action? The dissent argues that Congress may simply confer constitutional standing if the government violates its own regulations or if the Executive agencies promulgate rules
which violate procedures mandated by Congress. They argue that most
government conduct can be classified as "procedural" and that procedural injuries caused by government action may be redressed by the
courts without additional proof of standing. The example they give is the
issuance of a pollution permit and the right of those affected by the pollution to sue. The majority would say that such a procedural injury can abrogate the need to demonstrate immediacy and redressability (and thereby
causation), but that injury-in-fact must still be shown. In the pollution permit example, injury, and therefore standing, would be clear.
68. Id. at 2154 (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) and
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 U.S. 1046 (1992)).
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Perhaps the dissent misinterprets the majority here. Scalia says
specifically, "We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural
rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are
designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing." 69 This decision only transfers power to the

Executive to the extent that Executive decisions may be unreviewable if
their actions cause no particular harm. If harm can be demonstrated, then
agency procedural violations are reviewable.
Kennedy and Souter

The short opinion by these two justices identifies several imp~rtant points of logical concurrence with the dissent that may build future
pluralities. They agree that it is silly to require plaintiffs to make specific
plans (buy airplane tickets) to demonstrate potential harm. However,
something more than vague hopes to see animals is required. They cite
with favor the ecosystem nexus approach in the whaling case. 70 In the
future, if an ecosystem nexus approach or a professional nexus approach
is reasonable under the facts, then Kennedy and Souter might join Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens in finding injury-in-fact.
The second issue addressed is: What are the outer limits of Congress' right to "define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before... ?"71
Kennedy says that, "Congress must at the very least identify the injury it
seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to
bring suit." 72 One way for Congress clearly to accomplish this goal, of
linking the injury to the class of people allowed to bring suit, would be to
revise the wording of the Endangered Species Act. A revised citizen suit
provision could be worded as follows: "that inasmuch as the extinction of
species may harm a broad class of citizens through loss of opportunities
for aesthetic appreciation, recreational enjoyment, economic benefit, and
professional study, among other things, any person who suffers such personal harms because the government violates the procedural strictures of
the ESA and its enabling regulations, may sue to enforce those procedures." That wording would probably get the support of at least five justices and possibly nine. Injury-in-fact is clearly required by such wording.
Stevens, Concurring in the Judgment
Stevens' opinion is a mixed blessing. On remand, the District
Court granted Defenders' motion for summary judgment on the merits
69. Defenders V, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 n.8.
70. Id. at 2146 (Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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and denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
standing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court majority
reversed and remanded. Effectively, this mooted a rehearing on the merits
due to lack of standing. Stevens concurs in the judgment of reversal
because, on the merits, he does not believe that Congress intended the
consultation requirement to apply to actions in foreign countries. 73 The
effect of the reversal is to sustain the DOI regulation that consultation is
only required for agency actions in the United States and on the high seas.
Stevens' position is, of course, arguable, but whatever the arguments, it
could be remedied by more specific language in the ESA that Congress
intends consultation to apply to projects the United States funds or partially funds in foreign countries.
On the standing issue, Justice Stevens disagrees with the majority
and concludes that Defenders have standing to sue. In fact, he takes an
expansive view of injury-in-fact and concludes that plaintiffs Kelly and
Skillbred have demonstrated that they will be injured if the projects
destroy endangered species or their habitat.

SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT STANDING
Injury-in-fact is the one absolute and fundamental requirement
for demonstrating constitutional standing. If a professional, economic,
ecosystem or other concrete nexus can be proved, it is likely that injury-infact will be demonstrated to the satisfaction of at least five members of the
United States Supreme Court (Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, Kennedy,
and Souter). The more concrete and particularized the injury, the more the
Court will approach unanimity on this issue.
Causation should be addressed and shown, especially if the
injury is not due to a procedural violation. Scalia, writing for Rehnquist,
White, and Thomas, finds that, "there is much truth to the assertion that
'procedural rights' are special" 74 and that a person accorded a procedural
right (by Congress) does not have to meet the normal standards for redressability and immediacy and, by implication, causation. Kennedy and
Souter would probably agree with this view for procedural injury and
might go further in that Congress may, more generally, confer standing for
any type of injury as long as injury-in-fact is satisfied. Stevens finds the
harm, in this case, substantive and he finds that the injury was redressable. By implication, this may indicate that Stevens would want all three
elements addressed even for a procedural injury. Blackmun and O'Connor
apparently believe that a procedural injury is an injury-in-fact. However,
73. Defenders V, 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Justice Stevens, concurring
74. Id. at 2142 n.7.

in the judgment).
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they discuss redressability, so it does not seem that they find this concept
contained within procedural injury. In summary, whether or not an organization pleads procedural injury, it would be prudent to address thoroughly all three elements and to point out that the citizen suit provision
surely obviates the need to satisfy prudential requirements.
APPLICATION TO A PENDING CASE
On May 28, 1992, the Fund for Animals, the Defenders of Wildlife,
In Defense of Endangered Species, and nine named individual plaintiffs
joined together to file a complaint against the Secretary of the Interior,
Manuel Lujan, and the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), John Turner, in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. 75 Claim One is that defendants are unreasonably delaying
the listing of endangered and threatened species. Claim Two is that the
FWS has unlawfully employed the "warranted but precluded designation" to deny the protections of the Endangered Species Act to endangered and threatened species. Such a designation means that there is
sufficient information to warrant listing a species, but the FWS finds that it
is not possible to finalize the listing because of the workload related to
pending proposals. 76 Plaintiffs seek a court order essentially declaring
that their claims are true and directing FWS to expedite the process in
accord with a schedule to be determined by the court. They also seek an
injunction precluding a continuation of past "delay" tactics, implementing a monitoring system, and directing FWS to conduct annual scientific
review of all "warranted but precluded" species. They brought suit under
the citizen suit provision of the ESA. The lessons learned above with
regard to standing may be applied to this case, in a general way, on the
basis solely of the complaint.
Injury-in-fact
In the Fund for Animals complaint, three problems may exist with
the injury-in-fact requirement. First, while it is true that organizations
may seek and attain standing as organizations if their essential missions
have been harmed (the apparent strategy of the organizational plaintiffs in
this case), it would be prudent to add at least one individual plaintiff from
each organization who has suffered a concrete and particularized individual harm. Perhaps some of the individual plaintiffs already joined are
members of the plaintiff organizations. If so, the organizational affiliation

75. Fund for Animals, et al. v. Lujan and Turner, No. 92-800 (D.D.C. filed May 28, 1992).
76. Id. at 28.
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should be specified. In addition, the organizations need to be more specific about exactly how the delays have impaired their information flow.
A second point relates to injury-in-fact. The plaintiffs claimed that
because of the delays, it has been necessary to finance alternative efforts to
protect species. 77 In order to support this allegation of harm, specific activities undertaken should be listed and dollar figures given, if known.
Third, for purposes of withstanding a motion to dismiss for lack
of standing, the general claims of injury are probably sufficient to establish
standing. However, for trial and summary judgment motions, the allegations need to be more specific. For example, X is a professional outfitter
and guide who leads people into the wilderness to observe endangered
and threatened species in their native habitat. Accelerated extinctions are
costing him business. Y is a professor of botany studying wetlands ecosystems; the threatened destruction of wetlands in her study area will destroy
her data base. She could finish four more papers but for that destruction
and may not make tenure because of it. Z is a nature photographer who
had hoped to publish a coffee table book showing the flora and fauna of a
particular area. There are Xendangered or threatened species there. A proposed development may destroy the habitat before he can finish the book.
Concrete economic harms get a lot of sympathy with the current Supreme
Court. However, less pecuniary harms to aesthetic, recreational and other
interests, are, of course, also cognizable.
Causation and Redressability
The Fund for Animals suit asserts that, because the FWS has not
formally listed category 1 and 2 species that it knows to be endangered or
threatened, these species are at increased risk of extinction and such
extinctions would, in fact, harm the plaintiffs. The complaint implies procedural injury but this should be specifically argued.
Because most of the Justices in Defenders V addressed causation
and/or redressability, even when there is a procedural injury, it would be
prudent to allege: 1) causal links between not listing species and threatened harm, and 2) the ways in which listing would protect species from
extinctions that in turn would harm members.

CONCLUSION
The principal lesson of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders V) is
that when environmental organizations challenge governmental actions,
they must take care to make it clear that their members have suffered concrete, particular injuries that were caused by the government action and
77. ld. at 5.
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that the requested remedy will redress the asserted harm. Procedural injuries are "special" and may obviate the need to establish redressability, and
perhaps causation, but a prudent complaint should carefully establish
injury-in-fact, causation and redressability because the Supreme Court justices are divided on the need to address all three. Citizen suit provisions in
legislation may safely be viewed as obviating only the need to address
specifically prudential standing concerns. Congress may not, by fiat, confer constitutional standing.
The essence of Defenders V is that in order for the court to hear a
case, concrete harm to at least one individual is absolutely required. It is
ironic that, because of the case or controversy requirement of the Constitution, harm to people must be found in order to preserve endangered
animals and plants. If it can be demonstrated that people are harmed by
agency actions, then, indirectly, it may be possible to rescue many imperiled species from the brink of extinction.
Nancy S. Grief

